INTRODUCTION
Christian ideology is deeply embedded in our culture. Some, such as former President George W. Bush and those who adhere to his conception of Christianity, celebrate the marriage of Christianity and the law; however, that union violates a fundamental principle of American law-that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion [.] " 2 However, because Christianity has become so instrumental in shaping the law, it is often difficult to distinguish religious interests from secular interests, or interests that favor an establishment of religion from those that do not. The inability to make such a distinction has rendered permissible both government funding of faith-based organizations and legally sanctioned discrimination against homosexuals.
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[Vol. 12:129 ceived by President Bush as evidenced by his Faith-based and Community Initiative. Then, the Article will briefly present the Supreme Court's holding in Flast v. Cohen 5 to assist in understanding the Supreme Court's construction of that holding in Hein, which the Article will discuss in greater detail. It will also present recent Establishment Clause challenges by taxpayers to government funding of faithbased organizations prior to Hein. Afterward, the Article will present the decision of the Southern District of New York in Lown v. Salvation Army, Inc., 6 which suggests that such a challenge may be the only possibility of recourse for persons subjected to discrimination at the hands of government-funded faith-based organizations.
The Article will then analyze the repercussions of Hein with respect to the entanglement between the Executive Branch and religion as well as President Bush's Faith-based and Community Initiative. It will proceed to argue that government funding of faithbased organizations violates the Establishment Clause, that faithbased organizations use religion to discriminate against homosexuals and that the government, by funding those organizations, also discriminates. The Article will argue that legally sanctioned discrimination against homosexuals is merely an imposition of Christian ideology upon the electorate, and as such, violates the Establishment Clause. In the course of that discussion, it will demonstrate that both England's break with the Catholic Church and the medical profession have led to a misconstruction of religious interests as secular and have given secular and scientific clout to discrimination against homosexuals.
The Article then argues that, pursuant to Hein, the Executive Branch may, immune from judicial review, use religion to denounce homosexuality or provide funds to faith-based groups that do so. 7 The article will discuss Lown v. Salvation Army, Inc., which suggests that the Establishment Clause may be the only possibility for recourse for those who have been subject to discrimination by government-funded faith-based groups; but that the Supreme 5 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) . 6 Lown v. Salvation Army, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d 223 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 7 A caveat: The author has consciously chosen to use the term "homosexual." The term is meant to encompass those who identify as "gay," "lesbian," "queer," "bisexual," or "transgender." The author stresses that this does not in any way demonstrate a belief on his part that those identities should be excluded from discourse but merely the reality that religious groups and the law generally do not recognize the diversity of the queer community. The author has decided to use the term "homosexual" for consistency and to alleviate confusion; however, when the term is used in his voice, it is meant to encompass the aforementioned identities.
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Court, in Hein, foreclosed that possibility, at least with respect to general expenditures by the Executive Branch.
I. CHRISTIANITY AND THE LAW
A. Heterosexual Morality as Christian Ideology: Homosexuality and Christianity
The Bible serves as the primary justification for Christians who discriminate against homosexuals. The book of Leviticus considers homosexuality an abomination, warning believers that, "Thou shalt not lie with mankind, as with womankind: it is abomination," 8 and that "If a man also lie with mankind, as he lieth with a woman, both of them have committed an abomination: they shall surely be put to death; their blood shall be upon them." 9 The texts, as well as modern culture, construe homosexuals as equivalent to sodomites. The book of Deuteronomy proclaims that, "There shall be no whore of the daughters of Israel, nor a sodomite of the sons of Israel. Thou shalt not bring the hire of a whore, or the price of a dog, into the house of the Lord thy God for any vow: for even both these are [an] abomination unto the Lord thy God." 10 Denunciation of homosexuality appears even in the New Testament, which Christians, especially Catholics, interpret as a symbol of and testament to the love of Christ for his followers. 11 The first book of Corinthians precludes the "effeminate" from inheriting the kingdom of God. 12 The Book of Romans describes a shameful scenario where men "leaving the natural use of the woman, burned in their lust, one towards another; men with men working that which is unseemly and receiving in themselves the recompence of their error which was meet." 13 Although the Torah and the Bible do not explicitly denounce sexual relations between women, proscriptions against same-sex relations have historically been construed throughout Anglo-European law as including both lesbian and gay male identities.
14 The Catholic Church, a powerful political and religious force, considers 8 Leviticus 18:22. 9 Leviticus 20:13. 10 Deuteronomy 23:17-18. 11 See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, 566 § § 2357-59 (Libreria Editrice Vaticana 1994) . 12 1 Corinthians 6:9-10. 13 Romans 1:24, 26-27. 14 See Ruthann Robson, Lesbianism in Anglo-European Legal History, 5 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1990) (refuting the misconception that Anglo-European proscriptions against homosexuality applied exclusively to men).
134
NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 12:129 homosexuality a burden akin to a physical or mental handicap.
15
Catholics do not deny the pervasive existence of homosexuals, but direct homosexuals to live a life of celibacy for which they will be rewarded in the afterlife. 16 The Catholic Church condemns not what it considers the homosexual condition, but rather acts of homosexuality. It directs homosexuals to accept the plight that is their homosexuality and assures homosexuals they will be rewarded for their abstinence.
17
Though the Catechism suggests that discrimination against homosexuals should be avoided, the Vatican, in 1992, in the wake of proposed anti-discrimination legislation in Congress issued a statement warning that anti-discrimination legislation could "encourage a person with a homosexual orientation to declare his homosexuality or even to seek a partner."
18 Though hypocritical, the statements by the Vatican are relatively humane compared to the statements by and proposals of members of the religious rightconservative Christians and Evangelicals. That same year, the director of the Coalition on Revival declared that "homosexuality makes God vomit,"
19 while fundamentalists, angered by President 15 CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 11. 16 Id. 17 Id. "Homosexuality refers to relations between men or between women who experience an exclusive or predominant sexual attraction toward persons of the same sex. It has taken a great variety of forms through the centuries and in different cultures. Its psychological genesis remains largely unexplained. Basing itself on Sacred Scripture, which presents homosexual acts as acts of grave depravity, tradition has always declared that 'homosexual acts are intrinsically disordered.' They are contrary to the natural law. They close the sexual act to the gift of life. They do not proceed from a genuine affective and sexual complementarity. Under no circumstances can they be approved. The number of men and women who have deep-seated homosexual tendencies is not negligible. They do not choose their homosexual condition; for most of them it is a trial. They must be accepted with respect, compassion, and sensitivity. Every sign of unjust discrimination in their regard should be avoided. These persons are called to fulfill God's will in their lives and, if they are Christians, to unite to the sacrifice of the Lord's Cross the difficulties they may encounter from their condition. 24 Bryant warned fellow believers that because homosexuals could not reproduce, "they must freshen their ranks with our children." 25 In response, queer advocates plead, "We are your children."
26
The rise of the AIDS crisis among the gay community in the early 1980s fueled further disdain of homosexuality by the religious right. Several representatives of the religious right, including former U.S. Senator, the late Jesse Helms, and founder of the Christian coalition and politico, Pat Robertson, called for the construction of quarantine camps for those suffering with AIDS to "protect the innocent." 27 In 1983, a spokesman for the Moral Majority warned that, "If homosexuals are not stopped, they will in time infect the entire nation, and America will be destroyed." 
B. History of Christianity and the Law
Ancient societies, including the Greeks, tolerated and even condoned homosexuality; Greece was eventually consumed by the Roman Empire, which was consumed, in turn, by Christianity.
30
Christianity's control over the Roman Empire marks the genesis of Judeo-Christian entanglement with modern American law. Roman Emperor Caesar Flavius Anicius Justinianus ("Justinian") became convinced, based on his Christian beliefs, "that the earthquakes, famine, and pestilence his empire had suffered were the consequence of God's wrath upon homosexuals."
31 His 77th Novella, promulgated in A.D. 538, reflects this belief by characterizing lust between men as disgraceful and as contrary to nature. 32 As punishment for violation of the statute, homosexuals were to be "tortured, mutilated, paraded in public, and executed." Justinian's Code served as a pretext to an even greater hostility toward homosexuality that arose in the 11th and 12th centuries. After the dissolution of the Roman Empire, a number of religious factions arose throughout Europe. 34 One of the most prominent of those factions was the Cathars. 35 The Cathars advocated "nonviolence, the end of private property, and 'spiritual,' i.e., chaste marriages." 36 The continued growth of the Cathars, especially in 29 Id. at 69-70. 30 [S]ince certain men, seized by diabolical incitement, practise among themselves the most disgraceful lusts, and act contrary to nature: we enjoin them to take to heart the fear of God and the judgment to come, and to abstain from suchlike diabolical and unlawful lusts, so that they may not be visited by the just wrath of God on account of these impious acts, with the result that cities perish with all their inhabitants. For we are taught by the Holy Scriptures that because of like impious conduct cities have indeed perished, together with the men in them. Id. The "perish of cities" refers to conventional understanding of the biblical tale of Sodom and Gomorrah wherein the cities of Sodom and Gomorrah were destroyed by "brimstone and fire from the Lord out of heaven," because their inhabitants had engaged, among a number of other sins, in sodomy. Genesis 19:24-25. 33 Id. 34 Id. at 872. 35 Id. 36 Id.
France, eventually drew the attention of the Inquisition. Opponents, including the floundering Roman Catholic Church, claimed that in order to maintain their chaste marriages, the Cathars sodomized their wives.
37
To retain control, Pope Innocent II launched a crusade of a half million men, who slaughtered the Cathars throughout Provence.
38
The Roman Catholic Church accused a number of sects of sodomy, incest, bestiality and orgy well into the 14th century.
39
Pope Clement V, along with Philip IV of France, in an effort to seize their treasury, extinguished the Order of the Knights Templar. 40 Together, they forced the Templars to admit, under torture, that they had been "required to spit on the cross, enter [into] a pact with the Muslims, and commit sodomy with any Templar who demanded it." 41 According to scholar Arno Karlen, this formula of charges-heresy, treason, and homosexuality-became routine in heresy and witchcraft trials.
42
These medieval religious authorities characterized their inquisition not as a punishment, but as a cure. They prescribed, among other practices, burning at the stake for homosexuals. 43 In fact, the term faggot referred to the kindling used to light the fire under a criminal sentenced to burn. 44 Against this backdrop, Christian denunciation of homosexuality had permeated legal texts in England by the 14th century. Sir William Blackstone wrote that sodomy was a crime that "the express law of God, determine[s] to be capital. Of which we have a single instance . . . by the destruction of two cities by fire from heaven." 45 The appropriate punishment for the sodomite was to 37 Id. The characterization of the sodomite as a homosexual has been inconsistent throughout history. Sodomy seemed to be used interchangeably with sex between men, though that characterization was not exclusive. It would not become so until the medical profession created the term homosexual and made the homosexual synonymous with the sodomite in the 19th century. 38 Until the 16th century, regulation and punishment of homosexuality was the exclusive province of the Roman Catholic Church; however, the English monarchy secularized those proscriptions. 47 The 16th century hosted the great divide between England and the Roman Catholic Church. Henry VIII of England, in an effort to renounce Roman Catholic control, secularized Catholic doctrine by enacting it into law. 48 In 1533, the Reformation Parliament, at the behest of Henry VIII, made "the detestable and abominable vice of buggery committed with mankind or beast punishable by death."
49 Elizabeth I reenacted the Act of 1533 with a mandatory death penalty. 50 At this time, however, the crime of sodomy or buggery was not exclusively characterized as an act between two men, but also as an act between a man and a woman.
51
The proscription against sodomy in the United States began with the application of these English sodomy statutes in the colonies.
52 "Colonial law was essentially religious law, and 'all crime was . . . synonymous with sin.'" 53 Colonial Protestants condemned all sex outside of marriage and permitted sex within marriage only for the purpose of procreation. 54 John D'Emilio has suggested that the colonists considered non-procreative sexual activity as counterutilitarian. 55 "Sexual behavior that did not support reproduction, not even considering the 'counterproductive' and 'morally-wrong' acts of homosexuality, was seen as deviant, [and] 
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to those prohibitions.
58
After U.S. Independence, the original thirteen states adopted anti-sodomy laws similar to the Act of 1533, though most abolished the requirement of the death penalty as punishment. 59 Similar to their English predecessors, the laws failed to clearly define what was meant by sodomy or buggery or to whom those acts extended. Interestingly, the language of the laws began to reflect what Blackstone termed the "infamous crime against nature" and made less explicit reference to passages of the Bible. 60 This clearly demarcates the point at which Christian ideology became cloaked behind the façade of secular law.
The medical profession, by the 19th century, concretized this distorted perception that Christian ideology was in fact secular law. It created the term homosexual, clearly defined the sodomite as synonymous with the homosexual, and provided scientific justification for discrimination against homosexuals where such discrimination had once only been justified by adherence to the Bible. 61 In 1886, Richard von Krafft-Ebing published Psychopathia Sexualis.
62 Psychopathia Sexualis was received widely among the medical profession in the United States and Europe.
63 Krafft-Ebing posited that men and women were biologically distinct and, as 58 Eskridge, supra note 47, at 1013.
The American colonies followed a variety of approaches. The southern and middle colonies generally assumed or legislated that the Act of 1533 and its death penalty applied within their jurisdictions. Explicitly invoking biblical injunctions against men 'lying' with other men, New England colonies adopted statutes or policies covering more activities than the Act of 1533. Although the Massachusetts Bay Colony seriously considered but ultimately rejected the Reverend John Cotton's 1636 proposal that intercourse between women be included as sodomy, the New Haven Colony in 1656 prohibited under pain of death men lying with men, women lying with women, masturbation (if aggravating circumstances), and any other 'carnall knowledge.' The crimes of masturbation and women lying with women were dropped as offenses when the Connecticut Colony was formed in 1665, however. On the other hand, the authorities in Connecticut and Massachusetts, like those in Virginia, were willing to prosecute men and on at least one occasion women for same-sex lewdness without a specific statutory basis. Altogether there are records of no fewer than twenty sodomy prosecutions, and four executions, during the colonial period. 64 "Man 'has beyond doubt the stronger sexual appetite' and is 'aggressive and impetuous,' while nurturing woman 'remains passive' as the man woos her."
65 According to Krafft-Ebing, the anthropological development of a race was evidenced by the contrasts between the male and female genders. 66 He assumed that normal sex was vaginal intercourse between the masculine male and the feminine female and described any other sexual act as an array of deviations from that norm.
67
According to Krafft-Ebing, any predisposition to deviate from the norm was "rooted in a congenital defect in the deviant's brain or constitution."
68 "'Inversion' by women or men revealing physical or psychological characteristics of the opposite sex was for KrafftEbing a leading sexual pathology reflecting a broader mental or physical 'degeneration,' or reversion to a prior evolutionary status."
69 According to William Eskridge, Jr., "Americans were most fascinated with Krafft-Ebing's idea that any departure from strict binary gender roles (man=masculine, woman=feminine) represented a 'degeneration' to more primitive forms."
II. THE ESTABLISHMENT
A. A Survey of Governmental Approaches to the Separation of Church and State: Bringing Down the Establishment
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . ." 71 Although the text is seemingly clear, the question of what constitutes an establishment of religion has been a matter of controversy since before the adoption of the Constitution.
Madison and Jefferson
Debate as to the role of religion in the burgeoning nation arose in 1785 upon a proposal to establish religion in James Madison, in his Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments in Virginia, maintained that religion is wholly exempt from the cognizance of civil society, and that because the legislators acted as representatives of the people, religion was beyond the purview of the legislature. 75 He insisted that free government depended not only on a strict separation of religious and civil authority but also that religion, in order to maintain freedom, must not be used in any way to overleap the civil rights of the people.
76 "The Rulers who are guilty of such an encroachment," he stated, "exceed the commission from which they derive their authority, and are Tyrants. The People who submit to it are governed by laws made neither by themselves nor by an authority derived from them, and are slaves." 77 Jefferson, in opposing the establishment of religion in Virginia, purported that establishment of religion not only violated the civil rights of man, but also the will of God who ". . . chose not to propagate [religion]" by coercion, creating in humanity a free mind. 78 According to Jefferson, the assumption of dominion over the faith of others by legislators and rulers is impious and deprives a citizen of his liberty. 79 With respect to legally required financial contribution to religion, Jefferson stated that ". . . to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical . . . ." 80 After adoption of the Establishment Clause, Jefferson professed that the "act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature should 'make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,' . . . [ Jefferson believed that the Establishment Clause applied not only to Congress but also to the President. 83 As President, he refused to declare a national day of fasting and prayer. 84 In response to criticism, he explained that civil powers alone have been given to the President of the United States and that he had no authority to direct the religious exercises of his constituents. "Congress thus inhibited from acts respecting religion, and the Executive authorized only to execute their acts, I have refrained from prescribing even occasional performances of devotion." 85 Madison, although similarly opposed to the idea of a national day of thanksgiving, eventually succumbed to popular pressure; however, he later regretted his actions. 86 In hindsight, he wrote that "[r]eligious proclamations by the Executive recommending thanksgivings [and] 
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At issue in Everson was whether a local school board could reimburse the transportation costs of parents who had sent their children to private or parochial schools. 90 The Court conceded that the Establishment Clause prohibited the contribution of tax-raised funds to support institutions that teach the tenets of any faith; however, it held that the ordinance at issue did not violate that prohibition. 91 It is unclear as to why the Court concluded as it did; however, the Court generally mentioned that the ordinance permitted reimbursement for parents who had sent their children to non-parochial private schools. 92 The Court, in its dicta, adopted the strictly separationist views of both Madison and Jefferson, while its holding suggested that indirect government funding of religion was permissible. 93 
Burger
Establishment Clause jurisprudence took a dramatic turn with Lemon v. Kurtzman, 94 the case which would become the keystone of Establishment Clause jurisprudence. In Lemon, the United States Supreme Court invalidated, in relevant part, a Pennsylvania statute that reimbursed religious schools for the costs of teachers' salaries and a Rhode Island statute that directly supplemented the teachers' salaries by fifteen percent. 95 In doing so, Chief Justice Burger announced a three-pronged test for determining whether a statute violates the Establishment Clause. "First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.'" 96 for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between church and State. The Rhode Island statute required, as a prerequisite to application for a salary supplement, that the teacher agree in writing "not to teach a course in religion for so long as or during such time as he or she receives any salary supplements." 97 The Court accepted the States' intentions to "enhance the quality of the secular education in all schools covered by the compulsory attendance laws" 98 as a valid secular purpose. The Court suggested with respect to the Rhode Island statute, that direct government funding of religious activity would always have the primary effect of advancing that religious activity. 99 It concluded that "a dedicated religious person, teaching in a school affiliated with his or her faith and operated to inculcate its tenets, will inevitably experience great difficulty in remaining religiously neutral. Doctrines and faith are not inculcated or advanced by neutrals."
100 The Court held further that the continuing state surveillance required to ensure that recipient-teachers remained religiously neutral created excessive entanglement with religion.
101
The Court also invalidated the Pennsylvania statute based on similar grounds for invalidating the Rhode Island statute. 102 The Court distinguished Everson in response to a claim, based on the Court's decision in Everson, that the statute was constitutional because it provided indirect funding in the form of reimbursements as opposed to direct payment of salary. 103 The Court noted that the indirect payment in Everson was to parents, not to the religious schools.
104
The Court also concluded, with respect to both statutes, that the political debate along religious lines that had and would inevitably continue to ensue constituted an excessive entanglement with religion. 105 The Court stated that "[o]rdinarily political debate and division, however vigorous or even partisan, are normal and healthy manifestations of our democratic system of government, but political division along religious lines was one of the principal evils against which the First Amendment was intended to protect."
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Most notable, is the Court's suggestion that direct government funding of religious institutions "would be a relationship pregnant with involvement" 107 that would always require government surveillance that the underlying activities were not religious and would therefore always constitute excessive entanglement.
Rehnquist
Despite the Court's suggestion, if not outright holding, in Lemon, that direct government financial assistance to religious organizations always precipitates excessive entanglement with religion, the Court, in Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 held that religious organizations could, consistent with Lemon, receive direct financial assistance from the government. 109 In Bowen, a number of taxpayers and clergy challenged the constitutionality of the Adolescent Family Life Act, which Congress had enacted to combat teen pregnancy. 110 Pursuant to the act, a variety of groups, including religious groups, would receive government funds to combat premarital sex and teen pregnancy.
111 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, accepted as a valid secular purpose the "prevention of the social and economic injury caused by teen pregnancy and premarital sex." 112 The ultimate issue became whether the government's direct funding of religious organizations had the primary effect of advancing religion. 113 The Court held that it did not. 114 The Court held that the Establishment Clause permits direct government funding of religious organizations but "prohibits the government from directly funding the inculcation of religious beliefs." 115 Therefore, the Court suggested that direct funding of religious organizations by the government was permissible so long as the funds were used for secular purposes.
Chief Justice Rehnquist also undermined, as he had done in previous dissents, the third prong of Lemon. He conceded that the mechanisms required to ensure that religion is not being advanced necessarily create an excessive entanglement with religion by the government 116 ; however, here the Court asserted that the religious 107 The Court held that the statute at issue was constitutional on its face but remanded the case to determine whether it was constitutional as applied. 118 The Court directed the lower court to determine whether funds had been used for religious purposes. 119 In doing so, the Court suggested that evidence of religious neutrality permits a statute to survive constitutional scrutiny on its face. 122 Pursuant to the Act, federal funds were disbursed to state boards of education who in turn distributed those funds to public schools.
123 Recipients of those funds would then send teachers to work in private and parochial schools. 124 The purpose of the program was to provide assistance to the children of low-income families who were attending private or parochial schools by supplementing the cost of education. 125 The Court accepted assistance to the children of low-income families as a valid secular purpose. 126 The Court held further that the statute did not have the primary purpose of advancing religion because the state made the funds available, "generally without regard to the sectarian-nonsectarian or public-nonpublic nature of the institution benefited."
127 With respect to the excessive entanglement pro- 
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hibition, the Court expressly abandoned any presumption that recipients would be unable to separate religious inculcation from their secular services, as suggested in Lemon. Consequently, government oversight is unnecessary to ensure that religion is not being advanced, and excessive entanglement does not result.
128
Notably, the Court, in Agostini, subsumed the third prong of the test announced in Lemon. 129 The current test, which has become referred to as the "Lemon-Agostini Test," can be summarized as follows: A statute that provides direct financial assistance to religious organizations is constitutional where the statute serves a valid secular purpose and its principal or primary effect neither advances nor inhibits religion. A statute does not advance religion if it does not result in governmental indoctrination, define its recipients by reference to religion, or create excessive governmental entanglement with religion. further diluted the test that had been announced in Lemon. According to Justice Thomas, a statute serves a valid secular purpose so long as it is applied to the state in a neutral manner. 132 According to the plurality, a statute is neutral when "religious, irreligious, and areligious are all alike eligible for government aid." 133 The issue in Mitchell was whether the Federal Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981, under which public and private schools could opt to partake in a program where the state would provide secular educational materials purchased with federal funds, violated the Establishment Clause. 134 The plurality held that it did not. 135 Although the Lemon-Agostini Test seems to have been almost completely abandoned, the revised test announced in Mitchell is not binding precedent because the decision was reached by a plurality, not a majority of the Justices. 136 ") . 140 The President's goal, as expressed in the Executive Order, was to provide faith-based entities with an equal opportunity to compete with secular service organizations for federal funds.
141 The Executive Order also described the Office's functions and integrated the Initiative throughout several federal agencies, "coordinated educational activities to mobilize the public, educated state, local, and community policy makers regarding the ways in which they can become involved, and eliminated unnecessary barriers that currently impede an effective FBCI."
142 That same day, President Bush signed a second Executive Order creating satellite offices within five federal agenciesthe Departments of Justice, Education, Labor, Health and Human Services, and Housing and Urban Development-and directed the agency heads to "coordinate department efforts to eliminate regulatory, contracting, and other programmatic obstacles to the participation of [faith-based and community organizations] in the provision of social services." ; however, the second, and more notable of the two, established an unprecedented role for the Executive. Entitled "Equal Protection of the Laws for Faith-Based and Community Organizations," the Execu- 137 Id. at 840. 138 tive Order extended the FBCI to all programs "administered by the Federal government, or by a State or local government using Federal financial assistance."
145 It also implemented a number of substantive principles.
146
Pursuant to the Order, religious organizations receiving federal funds under the program are precluded from discriminating against program beneficiaries with respect to religion; the organizations, however, need not abandon their religious character. 147 According to the President, that an organization may retain its religious character means that it may discriminate on the basis of religion or adherence to religious principles in hiring. 148 Organizations that engage in inherently religious activity-such as "worship, religious instruction, and proselytization-must offer those services separately in time or location from any programs or services supported with direct federal financial assistance, and participation in any such inherently religious activities must be voluntary for the beneficiaries of the social service program supported with such federal financial assistance."
149
It is important to remember that government funding of religious organizations engaged in social work did not begin with the Bush Administration. However, the creation of the FBCI Program is unique in at least two ways-it was conceived and executed solely by the Executive through the use of funds appropriated to the Executive Branch, and it expressly disposes of any need for religious organizations to create a secular entity to which government funds could flow. Traditionally, religious charities would create entirely separate secular affiliates for the administration of social services. 150 As a result of this process, those entities became familiar with intricacies of government funding and knew of the constitutional restraints associated with that funding.
151 President Bush, in creating the FBCI, sought to dispose of such restraints and increase partnerships with religious organizations. This expansion raises concerns as to whether less experienced groups will use govern- 145 Id. 146 154 In Flast, the taxpayer plaintiff had challenged the constitutionality of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 under which religious schools received federal aid. 155 The Court concluded that a plaintiff has standing to challenge the government's expenditure of funds as violative of the Establishment Clause subject to a two-part test requiring that the taxpayer establish: 1) a logical link between his or her status as a taxpayer and the legislation attacked, and 2) a nexus between that status and the precise nature of the alleged constitutional violation. First, the taxpayer must establish a logical link between that status and the type of legislative enactment attacked. Thus, a taxpayer will be a proper party to allege the unconstitutionality only of exercises of congressional power under the taxing and spending clause of Art. I, § 8, of the Constitution. It will not be sufficient to allege an incidental expenditure of tax funds in the administration of an essentially regulatory statute. . . . Secondly, the taxpayer must establish a nexus between that status and the precise nature of the constitutional infringement alleged. Under this requirement, the taxpayer must show that the challenged enactment exceeds specific constitutional limitations imposed upon the exercise of the congressional taxing and spending power and not simply that the enactment is generally beyond the powers delegated to Congress by Art. I, § 8. Id.
156
C. Recent Taxpayer Establishment Clause Challenges
DeStefano v. Emergency Housing Group
In DeStefano v. Emergency Housing Group, 157 the Second Circuit held that New York State's funding of the Middletown Alcohol Crisis Center ("MACC") violated the Establishment Clause.
158 MACC received ninety-five percent of its funding from the State of New York through its Office of Alcohol and Substance Abuse Services ("OASAS"). 159 Joseph Destefano, the mayor of Middletown, New York, in his capacity as a taxpayer, claimed that MACC's use of Alcoholics Anonymous ("AA") in its recovery program violated the Establishment Clause. 160 Using the test announced in Agostini, the court, while accepting that the state had a valid secular purpose for funding the program, held that involvement by MACC with AA would constitute government indoctrination with religion if AA staff supervised meetings and showed clients AA videos. 161 The court explained that a state is responsible for indoctrination where it directly funds programs that inculcate its recipients with religion. 163 Wisconsin's governor and the head of the Department of Corrections, among others, challenged the expenditure in their capacities as taxpayers. 164 The Department of Corrections instituted a program under which parole officers would recommend the program to parolees. 165 Although this case presented a similar controversy to that in 157 DeStefano v. Emergency Housing Group, 247 F.3d 397 (2d Cir. 2001). 158 Id. 159 Id. at 403. 160 Id. at 404. Alcoholics Anonymous, in its recovery program suggests that members make "a decision to turn [their] will and [their] life over to the care of God as [they] underst [and] Him." Whether this submission is in fact meant to be religious, is highly contested. One AA member was "saddened and offended" by the Supreme Court's misinterpretation of the statement. To members, submission to belief in God means nothing more than submission to a belief that certain things are beyond one's control, such as addiction to alcohol and drugs. 161 Id. at 417-420. 162 Id. at 417. 163 The program at issue in McCallum called participants to accept that addiction is the product of "deep 'soul sickness'" 168 and that addiction could be overcome only through developing a personal connection with God. 169 Similar to the court in DeStefano, the court in McCallum focused on whether the program led to religious indoctrination. In its analysis, the court first determined whether the program itself led to religious indoctrination and then considered whether that indoctrination was fairly attributable to the government. 170 The court found that the program, which included Bible studies and mandatory meetings on Christian values, led to religious indoctrination. 171 In fact, most participants arrived with no religious beliefs and left the program claiming some relationship with God. 172 In determining whether that indoctrination was fairly attributable to the government, the court summarily concluded that "[d]irect subsidies are viewed as governmental advancement or indoctrination of religion."
173 Consequently, the expenditure of funds to Faith Works, Inc. was found unconstitutional. 174 
Freedom from Religion Foundation v. Montana Office of Rural Health
In
175 the district court of Montana invalidated a program receiving funding pursuant to President Bush's FBCI. 176 The defendant, the Montana Office of Rural Health's ("MORH") mission was "to improve health care . . . for all Montanans through health promotion, disease prevention, and reduction of the impact of illness, disease and disability. 
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awarding sub-grants, gave preferential treatment to parish nursing programs. 178 The plaintiffs claimed that the state had violated the Establishment Clause by providing funds directly to those parish nursing programs. 179 The court, applying Agostini, agreed. 180 Most notable is the court's discussion of the secular purpose requirement of the Agostini test. The court rejected the state's asserted purpose, which was to provide secular health care through faithbased organizations, and instead held that the director of MORH "acted with the clear primary purpose of promoting and endorsing the use and application of Judeo-Christian principles in the provision of otherwise secular health care." 181 The court explained that the Supreme Court has given deference to the "government's statement of a secular purpose" unless it is clear that the "statement is a sham or insincere."
182 Here, the court detected such insincerity. The SSC, through its contract with New York State, administers child welfare services and day care on behalf of the state.
185
Nearly ninety percent of its clients are "referred by or in the custody of government agencies and are assigned to SSC involuntarily."
186 SSC derives nearly ninety-five percent of its budget from its contracts with the government. 187 The plaintiffs alleged that the SSC diverted the percent of its revenue from those contracts to the Salvation Army Church. 188 Although it had not previously done so, SSC, in the months prior to initiation of the suit, began to infuse religion into the workplace and monitor employees for adherence 178 Id. at *4. 179 Id. at *5. 180 Id. at *37. 181 Id. at *25-26. 182 Id. at *20 (quoting Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 586-87 (1987) The prospect that the Executive Branch may proselytize, however, is less alarming than the other possibilities opened by the Court's decision in Hein. As Justice Scalia suggests, the Executive may, immune from judicial review, implement programs that blatantly violate the Establishment Clause so long as those programs are financed through general executive appropriations and not specifically appropriated by Congress to that end. For example, the President could reorganize the FBCI so as to constitute a new source of funding for private faith-based organizations; he could eliminate any safeguard that those groups will not use those funds to inculcate religion, and in fact, he could encourage those groups to do so; he could decide to fund only those groups which advance the religion to which he adheres; or he could decide to fund only those religious groups which promote an agenda with which he agrees. Further, he could direct those groups to deny services to potential recipients based on their religious affiliations; and could direct those groups to deny services to potential recipients whose practices conflict with the tenets of a particular religion. This could all occur, of course, only where the funds expended by the Executive to implement the program or fund its recipients were derived from general executive appropriations. The plurality in Hein suggests that Congress would never make an appropriation so large and undefined as to permit this parade of horribles; however, as Justice Scalia suggests, there is nothing to prevent Congress and the President from negotiating as to the purpose of executive appropriations "behind closed doors" while formally labeling those appropriations "general."
By immunizing the Executive Branch from accountability to taxpayers, the Supreme Court has effectively given license to the Executive to proselytize or make expenditures in ways that would undoubtedly violate the Establishment Clause had such proselytization or expenditures been made by Congress. The plurality in Hein warned that construing Flast so as to apply to actions by the Executive would bring into question any number of actions by the Execu-tive with respect to the Establishment Clause. However, it is difficult to understand why such a result would be scorned as opposed to celebrated since the very purpose of the Establishment Clause was to prevent "the very 'extract [ion] Religion has become so predominant in our culture that the courts often take for granted that the interests it accepts as secular are based on religious ideologies.
The United States, for its own failure to provide for its citizens, has turned to faith-based organizations to fulfill the duties that it has failed to perform. What seems beyond the purview of the Court's understanding is that faith-based organizations engage in social service activities because of their faiths. It is religion that drives them, and, similar to the perspective of the Salvation Army, they are not social service organizations but religions that, in the context of their faiths, perform social work. From that perspective, any claim that government funding of faith-based organizations serves a secular purpose seems beyond comprehension. Funding of faith-based social services organizations merely assists those organizations in performing those services their religions call them to provide. Similar to the district court's suggestion in Freedom from Religion Foundation v. Montana Office of Rural Health, government funding of faith-based organizations in some situations does not assist in providing secular services; it promotes the use and application of religious principles in the administration of otherwise secular services. 
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The Court has given great deference to the government in its assertions of a secular purpose; however, it has afforded that deference, in the context of funding of faith-based organizations (and with regard to justifying discrimination against homosexuals), unwisely. It is admittedly difficult to distinguish, given the Christian influence in the United States, secular justifications from religious justifications; however, in the context of state funding of faithbased organizations, the distinction could not be any clearer. Recognition of the fact that it is religion that drives these organizations to provide the services they do makes any consideration of whether those services have the primary effect of advancing religion, result in governmental indoctrination, define recipients by reference to religion, or create excessive governmental entanglement with religion, obvious and inconsequential. 231 Current Establishment Clause jurisprudence requires that direct government funding of a faith-based organization serve a valid secular purpose and that it not advance religion. 232 In determining whether the expenditure advances religion, the Court considers whether the expenditure results in governmental indoctrination with religion, whether it defines its recipients by reference to religion, or creates excessive entanglement with religion. 233 Courts have repeatedly suggested that the oversight required to ensure that government funds are not being used for the promotion of religion necessarily creates an excessive entanglement with religion. However, the more proper assertion is that the funding itself creates the excessive entanglement. It seems clear that the funding is problematic if it requires intensive government oversight to ensure its proper use. Irrespective of the legalese, it seems, as a matter of common sense, that when the government pays religious organizations to provide services that it has failed to perform the payment itself creates an excessive entanglement between the government and that religious organization. If one accepts the assertion that faith-based organizations provide social services because of and in furtherance of their religious mission, it is undeniable that the government's funding of those services advances that religion and that there is no use of that funding which is not religious.
More interesting are prohibitions against religious indoctrination and the definition of recipients with respect to religion. If the 231 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 232 Id. 233 Id. government were to fund organizations based only on formal affiliations with recognizable religions, or if government funded services caused their recipients to identify with a particular religion, courts would, under the current standard, generally find the government expenditure impermissible. However, the focus of the courts is misdirected.
Courts consistently fail to recognize that for some, perhaps even most, beliefs and practices are informed by religious affiliation and ideology and, with respect to faith-based social service organizations, those practices and beliefs pervade the services they provide. Indoctrination does not result only where a program participant adopts a belief in Jesus Christ or Allah as a result of participation in the program. Indoctrination occurs where a participant adopts a belief or practice associated with the religion that has administered the program. Therefore, if a faith-based organization were to promote abstinence until marriage as a means for preventing sexually transmitted diseases or denounce homosexuality or abortion, and a recipient of that service were to adopt a belief that she had done something wrong by contracting a sexually transmitted disease or by having sex before marriage; or by having an abortion; or if she failed to have an abortion because she had learned it was not a viable option; or if she adopted an aversion toward homosexuals as a result of her participation, then she is indoctrinated with that religion.
Similarly, while it is impermissible for an organization to deny a prospective recipient services because of his religious affiliation, it may deny those services because of beliefs he may hold or practices in which he may engage that do not comport with the tenets of the organization's religion. Under the current framework, if an organization were to deny services to drug users, or homosexuals, or women who have had abortions, or any other person who had engaged in activity with which the organization did not agree, it would be permissible. To discriminate on the basis of religion means more than denying services to someone because he is a Jew, or a Christian, or a Muslim-it means denying services to a person because one does not agree, based on his religious beliefs, with the actions or "lifestyle" of that person. This sort of religious activity can never be separate in time or place from the social services it provides. If one is to understand religion as a series of practices and beliefs, one could recognize that religion is present during every point at which the service is administered-the religion is inherent in the service.
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Pursuant to President Bush's Executive Order, organizations that engage in inherently religious activity, such as "worship, religious instruction, and proselytization, must offer those services separately in time or location from any programs or services supported with direct federal financial assistance, and participation in any such inherently religious activities must be voluntary for the beneficiaries of the social service program supported with such federal financial assistance."
234 President Bush similarly misconstrues activities or justifications that are inherently religious. One must recognize that given the nature of faith-based organizations, all activities in which they engage are inherently religious-they are driven by their faiths to administer the activities and therefore the activities, even social services, are inherently religious. Furthermore, the manner in which faith-based organizations provide their social services is inherently religious-in the methods they use, the concepts to which they adhere, and the clientele to which they choose to cater.
Governmental Discrimination Against Homosexuals
Violates the Establishment Clause
Justifications for discrimination against homosexuals have become similarly convoluted. Courts either do not recognize, or fail to admit, that interests asserted by the government to justify the denial of equal benefits and equal opportunities to homosexuals are inherently Christianity-based. As such, those justifications render discrimination against homosexuals unconstitutional pursuant to the Establishment Clause.
Aversion to homosexuality is pervasive in the dominant denominations of Christianity and more particularly, in Catholicism. Traditionally, homosexuals and sodomites were subject to punishment by death and torture; however, many Christians now view homosexuality as a yoke that each homosexual must bear. The homosexual is meant to remain celibate so as not to commit the sin he has the tendency to commit. For his suffering, they would say, the homosexual will be rewarded in the afterlife.
However, this form of discrimination is moderate compared to those more fanatical sects of Christians who view homosexuals as predators, a group of persons conspiring to transform children into homosexuals themselves. Others, some of whom are our nation's leaders, view HIV/AIDS as punishment for the homosex-ual-a plague sent by God to purge the United States of these sinners.
Either form of discrimination against homosexuals-moderate or fanatical-is impermissible in a nation founded on a separation between church and State; yet such discrimination is pervasive in U.S. law. Christianity has become so deeply embedded in the law that the government, the courts, and the electorate can no longer distinguish those state interests that are secular from those that are merely an imposition of Christian ideology. This phenomenon is reflected both in government funding of faith-based organizations and in the justifications used to deny homosexuals equal treatment, equal opportunities-indeed, equal citizenship. Some, President Bush for example, celebrate the influence of Christianity in the law. President Bush's actions were guided by what some would call fanatical adherence to Christian views. His lack of remorse for questionable actions is justified by his sense of morality, which clearly distinguishes what is right from what is wrong. 235 Many Christians find this sort of advocacy comforting. While others, with respect to discrimination against homosexuals, have merely misconstrued religious justifications for secular ones. The inability to distinguish Christian from secular justifications, at least with respect to homosexuality, has its roots in history. Although homosexuality was accepted, and even condoned at the time of the Greek Empire, civil law became, at the rise of the Roman Empire, Christian law. The Catholic Church and the civil government were indistinguishable, as emperors like Justinian served at the pleasure of the Church. Everyone recognized that the law was based on Christianity; yet, it seems, in time, the people had forgotten and began to characterize Christian ideals as secular truths. This conflation, at least with respect to the United States, can be attributed primarily to two moments in history-England's purposefully disas- 
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In an effort to clearly break with the Catholic Church, England, in the 16th century, statutorily enacted law governing behavior that had previously been governed exclusively by the Catholic Church. This symbol on the part of the monarchy created the illusion that the monarchy no longer acted at the behest of the Catholic Church, but was a nation of civil law. However, the proscriptions against homosexuality were merely Christian ideals re-characterized as secular law. This law made its way to the colonies and eventually arose in State statutes. The statutes generally referred to sodomy and did not universally characterize the act as an act exclusively between two men; however, the proscriptions against sodomy were rooted in the Christian denunciation of nonprocreative sex. Discrimination against homosexuality in the law has been characterized as deeply rooted in our nation's history for that reason; yet, in reality the roots of such discrimination lead to Christianity. Consequently, those proscriptions violate the Establishment Clause because they serve no valid secular purpose.
The medical profession, and especially Richard von Krafft-Ebing in the 19th century gave scientific justification to discrimination against homosexuals. Krafft-Ebing, in Psychopathia Sexualis, both concretized the sodomite as synonymous with the homosexual, and, by characterizing homosexuality as an evolutionary defect, gave society a medical justification for its repression. He assumed that normal intercourse was penile-vaginal intercourse, and that any deviation from the norm was a sign of de-evolution.
Petitioners and their amici in Lawrence v. Texas 236 insisted that historically, the practice of sodomy was not associated exclusively with homosexuals and therefore that Texas's statute, which criminalized sodomy between persons of the same sex, but not persons of the opposite sex, was underinclusive. 237 Those advocates purported that the Bible's prohibition of sodomy was not a denunciation of homosexuality but a denunciation of sex without the possibility of procreation. They argued, therefore, that the Texas statute at issue, which prohibited only homosexual sodomy, was underinclusive because heterosexual sodomy could similarly not lead
